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ABSTRACT
The future of the Nordic model of welfare has been widely
debated in the academic literature. Some argue that the Nordic
model is not sustainable under the conditions of globalization,
while others argue that the way in which the Nordic model has
produced long-term stability under uncertain structural conditions
is evidence of the opposite. This article advances a diﬀerent per-
spective through analyzing discourses and frameworks of meaning
associated with the Nordic model, using Sweden and Finland as
cases. Based on semi-structured elite interviews, I argue that while
there is a consensus on the beneﬁts of maintaining a Nordic
model, the very ideas concerning the value foundations and insti-
tutional architecture of the model diﬀer greatly between elites.
There exists a variety of legitimate ideas associated with the
Nordic model and, consequently, these approaches, all of which
claim ownership of the term, represent legitimate facets of it, even
when they initially would seem to contradict each other.
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Introduction
A vast literature exists on ‘the Nordic model’ of welfare. Scholarly contributions, such as
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), have contributed toward
the Nordic model being discussed widely as a distinctive approach to welfare politics.
The label ‘social democratic’ has also been frequently attached to it and Sweden in
particular has been considered as the emblematic Nordic case. Outside of the academic
debate, political parties have also literally fought over the Nordic model. After the
Swedish center-right government made an ownership claim toward the concept, social
democrats swiftly reacted and applied for a patent for it (Edling, Petersen, and Petersen
2014, 28–29). The oscillating meanings of the Nordic model certainly demonstrate that,
despite some claiming that it is an essentially social democratic concept, it is common
property and a powerful symbol of national identity (Béland and Lecours 2008, 208;
Kuisma 2007a). Social policy can become an expression of national identity, as social
policy preferences are often discussed in terms of values that inform both economic
principles and political ideologies and deﬁne the national project (Béland and Lecours
2008, 197).
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After years of crises and challenges, it has been often asked what is left of the
Nordic model and to what extent it can be sustained in the future. Cox (2004)
suggests that the future shape of the Nordic model and the impact of austerity on it
is possibly an irreconcilable argument, yet there is evidence to suggest that the very
idea of the Nordic model is sticky. Indeed, the spat over conceptual ownership
between the Swedish parties is evidence of it. This article builds on Cox’s perspective
by analyzing ideational representations of the Nordic model, using Sweden and
Finland as cases. Therefore, instead of oﬀering yet another evaluation of the future
prospects of the Nordic model as something that exists ‘out there’ (Ryner 2007, 62),
the term is used here as a heuristic device and its meanings are explored through
language and discourse.1 Rather than a concrete policy program, it is the central
ideas associated with the Nordic model – communicated through language and
discourse – that are then shaped and recast against ideas of what are understood
as structural challenges, such as globalization, demographic change and global
ﬁnancial crisis (see also Kuisma 2013). Discourse analysis can help us understand
the central cognitive ﬁlters ‘through which actors interpret the strategic environment’
(Hay 2002, 214) and which inform their preferences and decisions for political
practice.
The article is based on qualitative data consisting of semi-structured interviews
with social and political elites in Finland and Sweden. The data are used in an
attempt to analyze the ideational representations of the Nordic model in elite
discourses. While most participants interviewed were reticent to talk about one
concrete policy model, many of them considered the ideas and institutions around
the Nordic welfare states as particular in comparison to other countries and
regions, and they considered it legitimate to use the term. While diﬀering from
each other, the views and accounts of elites form legitimate yet competing narra-
tives of the core principles and characteristics of the Nordic model and, as such,
challenge the ideal-typical representation as an internally coherent and predomi-
nantly (Swedish) social democratic political project. Based on the qualitative data
presented here, I argue that there are a variety of ideational representations of the
Nordic model of welfare in Sweden and Finland. These range from the obvious
national variations to intra-national interpretations and, while they might diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in their logics of appropriateness, they all are equally legitimate
narratives of the Nordic model.
The article proceeds in three stages. First, I will provide a critical overview of the
existing debate on the future of the Nordic model. In the literature, the current trends
and developments are evaluated against an ideal-typical representation of a Nordic
model that belongs to a ‘golden age’ of the welfare state (Wincott 2003, 2013). Hence,
the estimates of its future viability are dependent on the core characteristics of that
golden age model and it seems like there is no exact consensus on what its core
components actually are. Contrary to the ideal-typical construction of it, it has many
facets and it serves many purposes. The second section begins with the analysis of the
data, where the initial results are presented through a qualitative content analysis in an
attempt to summarize the data. The third and most substantial section concentrates on
analyzing the frameworks of meaning related to the Nordic model, using Sweden and
Finland as cases.
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Method and case selection
This article is built on a ‘paired comparison’ (Tarrow 2010) of two country cases,
namely Finland and Sweden. In the literature on the Nordic model, Sweden has often
been treated as an emblematic ‘social democratic welfare regime’ (Esping-Andersen
1990). This can be seen in the terminology as well, as the Swedish and Nordic model are
often discussed almost interchangeably. Indeed, as mentioned above, the conceptual
overlap between the Swedish and the Nordic model has made it possible for Swedish
political parties to ﬁght over the ownership of ‘the Nordic model’. Finland, on the other
hand, is the most understudied Nordic case, a late developer that caught up on its
Nordic neighbors arguably only in the 1970s (Kettunen 2001). A comparison of Finland
and Sweden could be considered as a ‘most diﬀerent’ Nordic comparison, since it is in
Sweden where social democracy has been the most hegemonic and Finland where it has
traditionally been the weakest (Kuisma and Ryner 2012, 326).
In order to analyze ideational representations of welfare, I conducted semi-struc-
tured elite interviews. My approach is based on a phenomenological approach to life
world interviews (Kvale 2007, 51–52), related to Giddensian double hermeneutics,
concerned with understanding the national frameworks of meanings and narrative
constituted and reconstructed by the elites (Giddens 1976, 79). The terminology,
metaphors and concepts that are used are not mere tools of communication but are
‘closely tied to political struggles and international exchanges’ (Béland and Petersen
2014, 1). The emergence of (what are presented as) new cognitive ﬁlters and the
discursive construction of these into structural challenges with real consequences,
such as globalization, are a part of these struggles and exchanges. Through interviews,
we can then explore the ‘repertoire of legitimate stories’ (Czarniawska 2004, 5;
Silverman 2006, 145), in this case, in reference to the Nordic model(s). This is because
in an interview, the participant engages in ‘discourse’ and gives ‘accounts’, which
represent a culturally available way of packaging experience (Kitzinger 2004, 128,
cited in Silverman 2006, 129). This is signiﬁcant, ‘because one may assume that it is
the same perception that informs their actions’ (Czarniawska 2004, 49). As such, these
perceptions and accounts are ideational reﬂections of ‘reality’ and they also shape it, as
the narratives will also reﬂect institutions and inﬂuence the direction of policy.
The initial analysis of data is based on qualitative content analysis on transcripts of
26 semi-structured elite interviews (13 participants in both Sweden and Finland). The
participants were selected through ‘selective sampling’ (Schatzman and Strauss 1973)
and included representatives of political parties, trade unions, business organizations
and civil society organizations (CSO) (Table 1).2 This follows a criterion based or
purposive sampling of participants driven on the key research questions, and where
the aim is to put together a heterogeneous sample of elites involved in issues relevant to
Table 1. Interview matrix.
State sector
Employer
organizations Trade unions
Center-right
parties
Center-left
parties
Civil society
organizations
Finland Interviews
23, 24
Interview 15 Interviews 14,
20, 22
Interviews 19,
25
Interviews 17,
18
Interviews 16, 21,
26
Sweden Interview 9 Interview 12 Interviews 1, 2,
5, 6
Interviews 7, 8,
11
Interviews 3,
10
Interviews 4, 13
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the welfare state (Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam 2003). The qualitative data consist of
interviews with a relatively wide set of actors in order to appreciate the complexity of
the elite discourse on welfare also beyond party politics. This is particularly relevant in
the Nordic context where, as was noted already by Childs (1936), civil society actors
and organizations have tended to be close to the state and also its legislative and policy-
making functions, a feature that is not entirely uncontroversial for all commentators
(Trägårdh 2007).
Like in most qualitative research, the sample is not representative of the whole
population or all elites, and the aim is not to produce generalizable outcomes, Rather,
the aim is to oﬀer a way into exploring and problematizing some key aspects of the
discourse through having access to accounts based on personal views and lived experi-
ences of the participants in the spirit of the phenomenological approach to the life
world interview. This also contributes toward the development and operationalization
of the ideational institutionalist approach.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to guarantee not only comparability
across the data but also to allow for ﬂexibility in the process and for the interviewer to enter
in a dialog with the interviewee (May 2001, 123). Thematerial was collected in 2009 and it is
a snapshot of particular elite discourses at the time. I am not arguing that this set of ideas on
the welfare state in the two countries is conclusive and complete. It is far from it. However,
what I argue is that the data presented here provide us with an example of the oscillating
quality of the Nordicmodel and show how it can be approached from diﬀerent perspectives
and appropriated for a variation of purposes. Other participants at another time might
provide the same and/or other interpretations.
Rather than coding raw interview data, I conducted ‘directed content analysis’ where
the categories of coding are predetermined driven by the main research questions
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005).
In order to analyze the public philosophy dimension of ideas (Mehta 2010), I coded
for statements relating to ideas on solidarity, equality of opportunity, equality of
income/outcome, geographical equality and welfare as a historical/traditional idea.
Within the ideas related to problem deﬁnitions, statements relating to the ideas of
speciﬁc problems and challenges faced by the welfare state were coded. These included
domestic and structural challenges, challenges external to the nation-state and ideolo-
gical challenges. I also coded for statements relating to the absence of speciﬁc problems,
in other words, statements that claimed that the welfare state has been successful, is able
to adapt, can be reformed and so on. The content analysis is by no means exhaustive
and is primarily aimed at illustrating the qualitative data in its entirety in order to
provide a starting point for the more detailed analysis of the interview material, as a
way of combining qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis (Schreier 2012).
Ideational institutionalism and Nordic welfare futures
The Nordic model of welfare is more complex than the ideal-typical model discussed in
much of the literature. However, some of its core features can be deﬁned. In a nutshell,
the Nordic countries have developed an approach to welfare politics where the state,
market and society have been able to produce a political–institutional conﬁguration
with a capacity to produce high economic eﬃciency together with high levels of equality
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(Einhorn and Logue 2003). More speciﬁcally, the Nordic welfare states are seen to be
characterized by a large and expensive public sector, tax-ﬁnanced welfare beneﬁts and
services organized according to universal principles, strong position of women and an
autonomous labor market working in a smooth relationship with the state
(Christiansen and Markkola 2006, 11–12; Kuisma 2007b, 11–13). Esping-Andersen
(1990) concluded that in international comparison, these were the most ‘de-commodi-
ﬁed’ welfare states, i.e. that the principles of access rested, more than in other countries,
on rights rather than status or contributions. Furthermore, as I argue below, one of the
features of the Nordic model is also that it exists at the level of ideas and that there is no
single idea or dominant discourse that would represent what the Nordic model is (see
also Kuisma and Nygård 2015).
While we should be careful of epochalism in welfare state research (Wincott 2013),
many make the argument that after the ‘golden age’, or the ‘third phase’ of Nordic
welfare state history, from the 1950s to the 1980s (Christiansen and Markkola 2006, 21),
the Nordic countries faced new challenges, ranging from political and ideological shifts
to European and global challenges. In the light of these challenges, there certainly seems
to be a considerable disagreement on the current state and future prospects of the
Nordic model. Indeed, the debate is characterized by the coexistence of two incom-
mensurable trajectories for Nordic welfare states.
Some authors have concluded that the Nordic model must necessarily bow to the
neoliberalizing tendencies of globalization (Scharpf 1991; Kitschelt 1994; Iversen 1999).
According to this argument, the realities of the global economy are such that a universal
welfare state funded through heavy taxation cannot survive and that the age of a social
democratic welfare state is well and truly over. However, others have argued, pointing
at inter alia the remarkably strong Nordic economic recovery following the 1990s
recession, that the Nordic model could yet again be celebrated as a potentially viable
alternative in generally neoliberal times (Geyer 2003; Steinmo 2003; Pontusson 2011;
Einhorn and Logue 2010). The Nordic welfare states in the late 1990s and early 2000s
are considered as a success story of institutional adaptation, introduction of new
industries and more centrist social democratic politics compatible with economic
globalization. In all this, the welfare state has played a direct role by producing a highly
educated and skilled population able to adapt to these changes (Iversen and Stephens
2008, 609). So, the story of an anti-market ‘golden age’ Nordic model becoming, at
most, a post-industrial neoliberalism with a human face is also an exaggeration, as
social democracy itself has proven to be capable of adapting to a changing political and
economic environment (Hinnfors 2006, 208–209; Béland and Lecours 2008).
Both of these sides of the argument are plausible. However, at the same time, both
of them struggle to conclusively explain what is actually going on and why. On one
hand, the Nordic model is treated as an ideal-typical utopian dream but as one that
is still able to adapt to the challenges of its time in order to remain close to its true
values. On the other hand, it is seen as an antiquated model out of touch with
twenty-ﬁrst century reality. To provide a new perspective to the debate on the future
of the Nordic model, I argue that we also need to look at the role of ideas and
welfare discourses in order to appreciate the relevant ideational frameworks that
both reﬂect the institutional practices and inform the processes through which they
are reformed. This can oﬀer an insight into the sociology of political and economic
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institutions by understanding the cognitive ﬁlters (Hay 2002) that inform much of
the debates and the strategic choices of political actors. Here, there are apparent
links between the social policy realities of the model and its existence as a national
symbol (Béland and Lecours 2008). This might not come as a total surprise, as it has
been argued widely that centralized systems of authority, such as the ones in the
Nordic region, have put much eﬀort in the construction of national identity
(Goodman and Peng 1996).
In comparative politics and political economy, a rich literature on the role of ideas
has emerged (see e.g. Berman 1998; Blyth 2002; Schmidt 2002b; Hay 2004; Béland
2010; Béland and Cox 2010). Much of this literature makes a strong link between
ideas and political agency. Blyth (2002, 39–40, 258–259) argues that ideas can be
used as political ‘weapons’. He suggests that in a particular crisis situation the
institutions that are seen as part of the problem need to be delegitimized by contest-
ing the very ideas that underlie them (39). This is partly what happened in the
Nordic countries during the 1990s recession, and it has been argued by some (see
Ryner 2002) that certain core economic ideas associated with the traditional social
democratic welfare model were recast during the 1990s and that rather signiﬁcant
policy change followed this ideational shift. This implies that ideas are used strate-
gically and that political actors are actively able to use them as means to an end.
Social policy is one of the policy areas through which governments can reach to the
everyday lived experiences of citizens and, as such, it can be used powerfully as a
part of political strategy (Béland and Lecours 2008, 200). While politicians can
deliberately use social policy ideas as strategic weapons, ideas are also anchored in
institutions, expressed through what could be described as ‘collective memories’
(Rothstein 2005) and the available ‘repertoires of legitimate stories’ (Czarniawska
2004, 5).
Importantly, though, these ‘legitimate stories’ refer as much to the set of values
and policy preferences that are the target of reform as they do to the reasons for
why the reforms are necessary. As such, instead of looking at the concrete ‘realities’
of the challenges faced by an ideal-typical Nordic model, or the policy responses to
it, I want to discuss and problematize the key ideas associated with the Nordic
model, and how elites understand and appropriate them in particular ideational
circumstances. From the ideational perspective, it is crucially important to remem-
ber that the pressures against which the future of the Nordic model is evaluated are
also ideational and they are shaped and communicated through discourse. It is not
even important for us to know if the external pressures, such as globalization, are
real or not. The way elites understand globalization is at least as important (Hay
and Smith 2010, 903). ‘For the sad irony is that if governments believe the [neo-
liberal convergence] thesis to be true (or, indeed, ﬁnd it in their interests to
present it as true) they will act in a manner consistent with its predictions’ (Hay
2006, 5). Following Schmidt, I argue that while some research is now emerging on
it, discourse is, also in the Nordic cases, ‘the missing element in the explanation of
policy change in the welfare state’ (Schmidt 2002a, 169). At least we can under-
stand how discourse shapes the politics of welfare. As such, this article is a
contribution toward the emerging ideational and discursive institutionalist
literature.
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Ideational representations of welfare
The qualitative data gathered through the semi-structured elite interviews were coded
for statements pertaining to ideas and values associated to the welfare state and these
were initially divided into two main categories following Mehta’s (2010) categorization.
These are, ﬁrst, ideas as public philosophy and, second, ideas as problem deﬁnitions.
Public philosophies are ideas that cut across speciﬁc areas. They are fundamental ideas
that help to understand the purpose of government policy in light of core assumptions
about the society and the market (Heclo 1986, cited in Mehta 2010, 27). Various
approaches on equality and social justice could be seen as such ideas. Ideas as problem
deﬁnitions, on the other hand, are particular ways of making sense of complex reality
and causal relationships between phenomena. It is about explaining what is going
wrong in society and why (Mehta 2010, 27). For instance, structural unemployment
could be seen to arise from globalization and failure of the industries to be cost
competitive, lack of incentives for the unemployed to get from welfare to work, an
education sector not ﬁt for purpose and so on. Some of the interviewees also discussed
areas relevant to Mehta’s third category of ideas as policy solutions but, as the main
focus of the article is on making sense of the ideational representations of the Nordic
model(s) in elite discourses, the detailed policy discussions were deliberately left out. It
is also the ﬁrst two levels of ideas that form the ‘legitimate narratives’ relevant to my
aims here. In total, the interview transcripts contained 642 statements on welfare that
fell into the two categories of ideas.
When comparing the balance of claims relating to ideas either as public philosophy
or problem deﬁnitions among the Finnish participants, there is a slight emphasis on the
latter (Figure 1). In other words, the Finnish participants understood and discussed the
welfare state often through its (perceived) failures or challenges. While the literature
points at external pressures and challenges, the Finnish participants tended to talk more
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Figure 1. Ideas on welfare in Finland.
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about domestic structural challenges, such as the ability of municipalities to provide
welfare services, the administrative and bureaucratic failures at both central and local
level, challenges associated with demographic shifts and structural unemployment. Even
where it would have been possible to explicitly link these developments to ongoing
external phenomena, participants rarely took the opportunity to do so. External pres-
sures such as conditions of economic competitiveness under globalization and the
increasing pressures from the EU were mentioned but they were often either secondary
or taken as given and, as such, not the prime targets for a detailed critique. With regard
to the politically and ideologically driven pressures and problems associated with the
welfare state, one of the key issues was increasing privatization and withdrawal of
government responsibility in providing welfare for all, which was seen as a predomi-
nantly negative development by most participants.
At the level of ideas as public philosophy, the participants made statements about
equality of outcome and equality of opportunity and many participants spoke of both
interchangeably. However, this was not internally contradictory, as often the ideals of
equality of outcome were linked to provision and availability of welfare services and
equality of opportunity more to the way in which welfare beneﬁts are distributed and
administered. Perhaps characteristically to the Nordic countries, geographic equality
was also mentioned as an important theme throughout the interviews. There is a strong
normative desire to ensure that the urban concentrations in the south of the country
and the rural areas to the east and north are not treated diﬀerentially in terms of welfare
services and beneﬁts. Here, the spirit of the 1930s cross-class compromise as the
cornerstone of the Nordic model (Alestalo and Kuhnle 1987) is still very much alive.
Among the Swedish participants (Figure 2), the ideas on equality feature more
prominently than in Finland. The Swedish discourse seems to be more politically and
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Figure 2. Ideas on welfare in Sweden.
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ideologically driven and less pragmatic in this sense. Again, claims on both equality of
outcome and equality of opportunity feature. However, as opposed to Finland, in
Sweden, the statements relate less to the importance of equality of access to services
across the country and more to abstract understandings of equality of status and
socioeconomic inequalities. Many participants thought that increasing income inequal-
ity was going against the Swedish model. While these statements could also be seen to
relate to ideas as problem deﬁnitions, I understood them to be value statements on what
the Swedish model stands for and what its core elements are at a level of ideas as public
philosophy.
On ideas as problem deﬁnitions, there is a strong sense of political and ideological
challenges. Similarly to the Finnish experience, many participants’ very deﬁnition of the
Swedish model is determined through the problems and challenges it faces. However,
the ideas of domestic and structural challenges are also a prominent feature of the
Swedish discourse. Here, the ideas referred to the administration of welfare services and
beneﬁts, issues related to unemployment and making work pay, demographic shifts and
also municipal ﬁnances. External pressures in the Swedish discourse seem to play a
lesser role than in Finland. This is possibly just a consequence of heavier emphasis
being placed on domestic political and ideological debates and the increasing left–right
polarization, which has been accentuated by the emerging bloc politics during the last
couple of elections.
The repertoire of legitimate stories on welfare
The following sections will discuss the data in more detail and will get deeper at
exploring the ideational representations and the ‘repertoire of legitimate stories’
(Czarniawska 2004, 5) emerging through the ideas represented in the interviews.
These are divided, for analytical purposes, as discussed above, primarily into two
categories, ideas as public philosophy and ideas as problem deﬁnitions (Mehta 2010).
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the key themes from the qualitative data.
Ideas as public philosophy
When the content analysis is broken down, it is possible to see clearer diﬀerences
between the participants. However, it is diﬃcult to see very strong polarization
along traditional left–right partisan lines, even on ideas related to equality. In
Finland, the participants from CSO were the most prominent supporters of equality
of outcome:
A Finnish citizen or Finnish resident, regardless of where they live and what their back-
ground is, has equal right to services . . . and our constitution guarantees it. (Interview 26)
There is a sense that despite a wide agreement upon the value of equal access to welfare,
this has slowly been given up. Here, statements expressing concern for increasing
income inequality are understood to represent support for equality of outcome. For
the political left, this was slightly more salient than equality of opportunity. However,
participants from center-right political parties and the employer organization repre-
sented the clearest emphasis on equality of opportunity.
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. . .I deﬁnitely think that this system where the basic idea is equality of opportunity is good
but then there should also be an incentive element involved because otherwise the system
won’t work. . . (Interview 19)
Participants often linked equality of opportunity to incentives and the idea of ‘no rights
without responsibilities’, a neoliberal theme that had been a popular Third Way mantra
in the 1990s (Kuisma and Ryner 2012, 330). This was partly linked to employment as a
responsibility and the increasing popularity of the idea that ‘work is best social security’
(Interview 25). The category of statements relating to equality of opportunity also
includes statements in support of increased means-testing, activation, responsibilization
and making work pay. The argument here often is that the welfare system needs people
Table 2. Theme summary of Finnish welfare discourses.
Solidarity ‘Never leave a friend behind’ and the ‘Spirit of the Winter War’
Equality of opportunity Looking after the weakest in society
Discourse on equality of opportunity is considered novel – social mobility evidence of how
it has been achieved, with focus on education
Incentives from welfare to work – social security must be earned
Equality of outcome Welfare state needs to beneﬁt everyone – maintaining a relatively high level of basic social
security
Increasing income inequalities considered negative
Everyone contributes, everyone beneﬁts
Redistribution of income as a means to social justice
Publicly funded education as equality of outcome
Geographic equality Access to same services regardless of where you live
Having municipalities in charge of welfare services guarantees coverage across the country
High-quality publicly funded education important
Welfare state as
cultural value
Welfare state as a part of the national project – post-war reconstruction
Tradition of agreement and consensus in welfare politics
Value of work – protestant work ethic
Works well The Nordic model a source of adaptability and competitiveness
A stable environment with few disruptions – high levels of trust
Welfare linked to democratic principles of cooperation and consensus
The world wants more Nordic model – ranking and league table success
Too expensive Level of public debt is too high – social spending will increase further during an economic
downturn
Financial problems leading to the 1990s crisis
Current tax income not enough to ﬁnance the system
External pressures External pressures mean that taxes cannot be increased
Opening up of capital and labor markets a challenge for the model
New limitations due to the EU – tax harmonization in the future
Global competition drives work away from Finland and some Finnish companies are also
now in foreign hands
Impact of global ﬁnancial crises
Domestic pressures The legacy of the 1990s’ recession on social and economic structures
Demographic challenge – aging population, decreasing labor force
Moving from state control to municipal responsibility of welfare services in 1993
problematic – caused the ‘purchaser-provider model’
Bad municipal ﬁnances – accessibility and quality of services suﬀers
Not enough incentives for people to get from welfare to work
The welfare state is too complex administratively
Level of employment not high enough for the current dependency ratio
Ideological pressures EU and globalization used as scapegoats to hide ideological agendas
Neoliberalism – responsibility from state to individual
Privatization is seen increasingly as a possibility
Approach to work has changed – from a right to responsibility
People are more greedy – capitalism and consumerism
Entrepreneurialism – businesses and the rich have got tax cuts etc.
Rising inequalities not seen a problem anymore
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to get from welfare to work or otherwise it will become too expensive to maintain. The
deserving/non-deserving poor dichotomy is, therefore, also becoming prominent in the
Finnish context. Interestingly, this perspective sits rather comfortably with protestant
work ethic and the sense of individual responsibility historically signiﬁcant to the
development of the Nordic model (Kettunen and Petersen 2010, 6).
. . .we can look after the interests of the poor but someone who is lazy and poor doesn’t
deserve anything. So, if you are lazy, you won’t be supported, we don’t want to support
you. . . (Interview 25)
Table 3. Theme summary of Swedish welfare discourses.
Solidarity Everyone’s in the same boat – universalism feeds cohesion
Everyone wants to contribute – solidarity via taxation
Solidarity as a way of sharing risks in society
Equality of opportunity The welfare state is a safety net
Sweden is a liberal society with an individualist culture
Individuals should have a choice over their welfare services
The most vulnerable should be protected
Equality of outcome Poverty as a taboo in Sweden – ‘there is no poverty in Sweden’
Gender equality – reducing the gender pay gap and also providing good public childcare to
encourage women to work
Growing inequalities in society a negative development – both in terms of income but also
other areas, such as health equity
Sweden has a history of high income equality
Income equality is good for the economy – social mobility
Geographic equality Welfare services should be available equally across the country
The importance of the income equalization system that equalizes tax income between
municipalities and county councils
Increasing inequality between regions is a negative development
Welfare state as
cultural value
Role of path dependence – the welfare state played a central role in the overall Swedish
development
People are used to the welfare state – it is a part of the national values
Works well Nordic model competes well in global rankings and league tables
Nordic model has made it easier to adapt to important changes
Not too many changes made to the core of the model – consensus – the changes that were
implemented, made the system even more robust
The American dream can be realized in Norden – education key
Too expensive Lack of incentives makes people passive and that is too costly
People demand more from the welfare state and meeting their increasing demands is
expensive
Growth to the limits – tax income diminishing and contributions are already as high as they
can be
External pressures Europeanization – EU pressures to a smaller public sector, lower taxes
Global mobility of capital – cost competitiveness is here to stay
Global trends – accepting negative phenomena like homelessness
The global ﬁnancial crisis and its impact
Domestic pressures Aging population and decreasing domestic labor supply
Problems with the structure of the system (ineﬃciency, bureaucracy)
Administration clunky – too many municipalities
More activation is needed to get people back to work
Replacement rates are too high
Legacy of the 1990s’ crisis – reform was a necessity
Institutional inertia and traditions – ‘we’re stuck with the welfare state’
Ideological pressures Neoliberalism – privatization and cutting back the role of the state
Cutbacks that don’t actually save any money – done ideologically
Social democratic politics in decline – failures of the Third Way
Political center has shifted to the right – ideological diﬀerences between Reinfeldt and
Persson governments very small
Less concern over increasing inequalities – ‘solidarity is banned’
Public sector has to generate proﬁt
Taxes reduced for ideological reasons
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. . .I think that one value that has been shared between employers and the union movement
has been the view that social security needs to be earned through work. . . (Interview 15)
These are related mainly to welfare beneﬁts. However, with regard to equality of outcome,
even the center-right political elites supported equal access to welfare services and did not
openly advocate a dualization of social and health services. Here, the statements on
equality of opportunity actually overlap with the statements on geographic equality.
[E]veryone regardless of where they live, how much they earn and how wealthy they are . . .
are oﬀered similar services in the health sector, social services and schooling and [we
have], or at least it has been often emphasized, a principle of geographic equality that arises
from Finnish political history. . . (Interview 24)
Trade union representatives emphasized the ideas as public philosophy less and were
more concerned about problems and challenges. One participant deﬁned the challenges
faced by the welfare state:
. . .the two main trends during the last 15–20 years . . . have been globalization, in other
words the ease at which production relocates . . . and the second is Finland’s position
within the EU. In a way, the question could be simpliﬁed so that two issues determine
Finland’s position: EU’s place in the world and Finland’s place in the EU. (Interview 14)
Quite typically for the sector they represent, trade union representatives linked the
future of the welfare state to challenges facing the Finnish labor market. Questions
related to production are, of course, very important, especially as the labor market
actors share a view that emphasizes the importance of earnings-related aspects of the
welfare state.
In Sweden, the picture is slightly diﬀerent. The debate on ideas as public philosophy
is more polarized between left and right, unions and employers. Representatives of the
political left talked about equality more in terms of equality of outcome and defended
universalism. However, no one talks exclusively about one or the other. Rather than a
clear division, there is a diﬀerence of emphasis.
[E]veryone has the possibility to receive welfare services and they are oﬀered to everyone
regardless of the thickness of one’s wallet. . . (Interview 3)
[U]niversal social programs, rather than income-related [programs] or [ones] speciﬁc for
groups, is the ﬁrst element . . . But [there are] also income-related beneﬁts, income-
replacement policies in terms of social insurance, which go high enough in the income
ladders so that large majority of the population are covered by income-replacement
programs and [the] third element . . . [is] the policy, which gives support to dual earner
families. . . (Interview 6)
However, the political right sits more on the liberal end of the value spectrum, arguing
for equality of opportunity, means testing and taking care of the poorest instead of
being concerned about income inequalities. In addition, while the left might still be
concerned about the generosity of beneﬁts or the scope of public services, the center-
right emphasizes quality of services and the right to individual choice. After saying that
the priorities lie in universal services, a participant added:
[T]he second part is that the services should be of high quality, in terms of medical quality
if you are talking about healthcare, but also cost eﬃcient. . . (Interview 11)
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Quality is often linked to freedom of the individual to choose the social and health
services and to ‘shop around’:
[W]e have this idea that you should have the possibility as an individual to make your
choice, not being forced to pick the one provider that exists on the market. It’s like . . .
buying a car. (Interview 7)
Despite these diﬀerences of emphasis, even when explicitly asked, all participants took
the idea of a Nordic/Swedish/Finnish model of welfare as their starting point or frame
of reference. No one questioned the idea of the Nordic model as such. Even the center-
right was keen to defend (the idea of) the Nordic welfare model. In fact, they often
claim that the big diﬀerences between them and the social democrats are not in the
value foundations of politics, or even in the way in which they understand the key
problems or challenges, but rather in the policy solutions (Interview 11). In fact, one
participant blamed the social democrats for betraying the Swedish model.
The core is that we have had systems that have thrown people into passivity and long-term
dependence on social insurance. It has not stimulated activity and therefore as a result we
have had a huge problem with people getting on disability beneﬁts and never being able to
re-enter the labor market. We have, for example, 550,000 disability pensioners of whom
less than one per cent will get back to the labor market. That’s the core issue: encouraging
activity and discontinuing passive insurance systems. (Interview 7)
Here, the problem is not seen to be the welfare state itself. Rather, the argument goes
that it has gone too far in providing rights-based universal beneﬁts and not creating
enough incentives for people to return to work.
As such, while the Swedish debate is more ideologically driven than the more
pragmatic Finnish elite discourse, the data clearly support Cox’ (2004) idea about the
resilience of the idea of the Nordic model. The Nordic model means many things for
many people and many diﬀerent public philosophies coexist within it. This is perhaps
not too surprising provided that the Nordic model was founded upon a tripolar class
structure based on a broad and wide cross-class compromise (Alestalo and Kuhnle
1987). Even the Swedish social democrats based their politics on becoming a party for
the people, on what Hjalmar Branting called a ‘big tent approach’ (Berman 2006, 157).
As such, the partisan social democratic elements of the Swedish welfare state may have
been exaggerated, as the model is, and always was, based on a broader set of values and
ideas appropriated for the use of parties of diﬀerent ideological convictions.
Ideas as problem deﬁnitions
However, beneath the solid yet diverse foundations of the Nordic model, the partici-
pants identify a range of problems and challenges. Here, there is much less disagree-
ment across the board and despite the relatively strong emphasis on external challenges
in the academic literature, the elites seem to be mostly concerned about domestic
problems and challenges.
In Finland, ideas as problem deﬁnitions are predominantly seen to be of domestic
(structural) origin. One key issue is the change of legislation in 1992 when central
government control of municipal welfare spending was removed and municipalities
were given more autonomy. This led to a widening gap between well-performing
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municipalities and those in genuine ﬁnancial diﬃculties unable to provide services to
their citizens.
This led municipalities controlled by bourgeois parties to use the funds diﬀerently to social
democratic municipalities and then when we had the severe recession the municipalities
. . . were in rather deep trouble because they had to decide themselves how to prioritize
money that had run out everywhere. . . (Interview 17)
In other words, this development scrutinizes the very principle of geographic equality as
citizens get diﬀerent level of access and quality of services depending on where they live.
This has also led to a purchaser–provider model for welfare services, which represents a
departure from the old system by introducing more market-based principles. It also
scrutinizes the old parameters of responsibility and passes the buck from the state to the
individual (Julkunen 2006).
Another domestic structural problem is associated with demographics:
[W]e did not foresee the economic crisis but we did know about the ageing of the
population. We have known it for 30 years already, we have talked about it for ﬁve to
ten years . . . We do not have to do anything else but look at the annual birth data and we
can see how large the bill will be. (Interview 14)
There seems to be consensus among the elites about demographic change as a key
challenge. The solutions, however, are not entirely agreed upon, apart from maybe the
desire to increase level of employment and the average career lengths.
Ideas relating to problems arising from the external environment are also pro-
minent in the discourses. These include the possible constraints arising from the
EU on taxation and public spending and the impact of global competition on jobs
and investment. Here, the elites have bought into the neoliberal convergence thesis
(Hay 2006) and, for instance, seem to accept that production costs in Finland are
too high and that companies will relocate abroad to pay less taxes and ﬁnd cheaper
labor. Apparently, even those companies who once were loyal cannot remain so
anymore.
[They] will be forced to do [relocate]. The ownership is in foreign hands, as they are listed
companies . . . [T]he CEO favoring Finland for some patriotic reasons without sound
economic justiﬁcations won’t be tolerated for long. (Interview 24)
This narrative is remarkable, as it openly gives the bargaining tools away from the state
or even a veto to the big companies. The so-called Lex Nokia controversy in Finland is a
case in point (Sajari 2009). To contrast this, some mention an argument related to the
Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice 2001) on comparative advantage
arising from a highly skilled workforce and innovative society.
[H]igh levels of taxation did not prevent Finland from being competitive because public
sector investment was used for innovation, education. . . R&D was one of the means by
which Finland was lifted up from the recession of the 1990s . . . and then we had the IT
boom and things like that. (Interview 17)
The only aspect of ideas as problem deﬁnitions where the old left–right divide becomes
apparent relates to political pressures. While they are not signiﬁcant concerns in Finland,
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there are some, especially on the political left, who suggest that the center-right’s thinking
represents a break from the past and that the drive for reforms is ideologically driven.
[T]he values represented by the political right emphasize that entrepreneurialism needs to
be rewarded more and this has been demonstrated in the gradual changes made in taxation
during the last 20 years that beneﬁt those with higher incomes. (Interview 14)
I think that in the past there was more of a consensus on equity. I ﬁnd it alarming that
when I talk about increasing income inequalities there are some who say ‘so what?’.
(Interview 26)
In Sweden, the ideas at the level of problem deﬁnitions are often also expressed in terms
of structural problems of domestic origin traced back to the 1990s crisis. Welfare cuts
and privatization are seen as a break with the past and the political left and the trade
unions are especially critical of it.
[I]n . . . the crisis during the 1990s we saw a greater part of privatization of previously
public driven services, more and more of the state services were privatized into some kind
of joint venture of companies . . . but also within the educational system there was a huge
privatization process. (Interview 5)
One participant claimed that the withdrawal of state responsibility is a sign of Sweden
completely abandoning its welfare model:
In the 1990s crisis we made the same mistake. The state did not help out the municipalities and
regional government. Local and regional government ﬁred teachers and school health personnel
. . . and now they do the same, as manymunicipalities already have so serious budget deﬁcits that
they have given warnings of teachers being sacked and schools closed. (Interview 3)
Here, it is clear that the withdrawal of state responsibility and the introduction of
privatization are generating inequalities between municipalities and that goes against
the principle of geographic equality. Indeed, while some do appreciate that some of the
1990s’ retrenchment was done in good faith – they genuinely believed that there were
no alternatives (Interviews 2 and 6) – many of the ideas as problem deﬁnitions are
ﬁrmly grounded in ideological debates and normative disagreements between left and
right. For example, the left does not raise dependency culture as an issue but concen-
trate more on socioeconomic equality rather than equality of opportunity. The center-
right claims that the welfare state in its current form promotes passivity and that the
only way to maintain the system is if people got back to work. Being oﬀ sick should not
be seen as a ‘right’ of the individual anymore and the gatekeeper functions of the system
should be strengthened (Interview 12).
[W]e . . . have a shortage of working age population, we have an aging society and we must
make people return to work, otherwise we cannot aﬀord to keep up the welfare state,
healthcare, daycare . . . schools . . . So, everyone that has a capacity to work should get the
support to get back to the labor market. (Interview 7)
The center-left does not disagree entirely but there is a diﬀerence of emphasis. The
center-right government sees dependency culture as the core issue whereas the voices
from the left-green bloc suggest that more could be done to give people opportunities
instead of forcing them to return to work. The diﬀerence might be as simple as the one
between the proverbial stick and carrot.
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As such, the problems identiﬁed by the center-right are seen as an ideological attack
on the welfare state by some voices from the political left.
Today, there is much more of an ideological threat against the welfare state from the right
of center parties and not the same division with the social democratic party at that time
but not a strong ideological counter-position, I would say. (Interview 6)
Ideological diﬀerences do certainly exist but they are downplayed in the discourse. One
participant said that there are ‘small ideological diﬀerences’ between the blocs.
They say that they like competition and saw competition as something positive, but they
couldn’t [introduce] proper competition between providers . . . [W]e say that we have no
problems at all with private providers. Actually, we see private providers as something
necessary in order to reach our goals for healthcare. (Interview 11)
On balance, portraying opposing views on privatization of health care as ‘small ideo-
logical diﬀerences’ is rather ﬂawed. However, as was pointed out, the privatization push
began already during the Persson government and this is an example of where the
center-right has abused the opportunities arising from the failures of ‘The Third Way’
(Kuisma and Ryner 2012). The possibilities for the left in launching a counter-argument
were slim, as the principles introduced by the center-right government were not the
antithesis of those of the previous social democratic administration and any critique of
them could be considered as a self-contradiction.
While especially the political parties seem to have a more vibrant debate at the level
of ideas, some suggest that outcomes also do matter. So, even if a vast majority of the
elites advocate the ideas of equality and solidarity, they do not mean much if welfare
outcomes are shifting.
We try to be so much better than others . . . We try to be something else but we are a part
of Europe and we are part of . . . globalization . . . [I]t’s ok to have homeless people because
they have it [them] in England and the US. . . (Interview 13)
This could be called ‘welfare state nostalgia’ (Andersson 2009). There is a very strong
set of public narratives and collective memories of Swedish exceptionalism and even
when there is change that makes Sweden less exceptional, it is diﬃcult to change the
legitimate stories of what Sweden is about and what it stands for. The welfare state is
taken for granted:
I think [the Swedish welfare state] will survive . . . because . . . I think we are used to it.
(Interview 4)
Indeed, the power of historical path dependencies is acknowledged, whether in good or
bad. As one participant said about the possibilities of policy transfer and learning:
But countries don’t change [just] like that, probably for good reasons. And hence we will
be stuck with the system that we have in Sweden for, probably, forever. (Interview 11)
Therefore, even if current actors do not share the values of the traditional golden age
social democratic Nordic model or believe that they can be honored in the current
circumstances, it is a strategically wise decision to package their policies with a public
philosophy that relates to the Nordic/Swedish model and that, at most, represents a
reformed or even improved variant of the traditional welfare state.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, while some have argued that the policy content of the Nordic model has
changed during the last decades, the idea of the Nordic model possesses remarkably
resilient characteristics. Or, what is resilient is an idea of Nordic approaches to welfare.
Even when framed with changing terminology and altered policy solutions, something
fundamentally Nordic can be found from Nordic social policy. It is not a monolithic
model and that precisely is its very strength. The scholarly debate on the future of the
Nordic model appears to have reached an irreconcilable stage. However, looking at the
elite discourses, it is possible to see that the diﬀerent welfare futures are not necessarily
as diametrically opposed as one might think.
A number of diﬀerent elites from the whole range of political convictions and
organizations seem to support the core ideas of a Nordic model but, remarkably, it
represents many things to many people and is much less of an ideal-typical and, hence,
clear-cut model than one would assume based on the literature. What is shared with
almost all references to the Nordic/Finnish/Swedish model is that it is primarily a set of
ideals, principles and aspirations. Almost all participants interviewed make a clear
distinction between what their variant of the Nordic model ought to represent and
what their interpretation of the current pressures and challenges is. The very content
and meaning of the word equality, from a more liberal equality of opportunity to a
traditional social democratic equality of outcome, is but one example. The policy
content of the welfare state and the challenges it faces are discussed but hardly anyone
questions its core principles.
In Finland, the discourse is more pragmatic and more about how the welfare state
adapts under (discursively framed) structural and domestic pressures. It is less about
foundational and distinctively normative debates. In Sweden, the dominant discourses
and narratives on welfare are clearly more polarized at the level of ideas and the
question is largely not about whether the welfare state is the root cause or the solution
to the problems deﬁned. This diﬀerence in national welfare discourses is perhaps not so
surprising. After all, the post-war history of Finland has been characterized by the need
to forge an internal consensus in front of external challenges whereas the Swedish
political debate has been much more ideologically polarized between left and right.
What is now characteristic in the Swedish discourse is a debate on what kind of an
interpretation of the Swedish welfare state would be needed in order to deal with and
even solve some of the current problems. In the end though, a distinctively Swedish,
Finnish or Nordic model of welfare will continue to exist at least at the level of ideas, as
the concept itself seems to carry meaning and relevance to elites and citizens alike.
Does all this mean that the twenty-ﬁrst century Nordic model is nothing but an
empty vessel to which a whole host of ideas and policy solutions can be loaded? It
certainly does not. While legitimate stories on welfare vary in Finland and Sweden,
discourse in both countries seems to be characterized by the oscillating meanings of the
Nordic model. Certainly, based on my argument above, it can be argued that the future
shape of the Nordic model will be determined by ideational factors, both in terms of
what ideas continue to be at the heart of a/the Nordic model(s) and which ideas and
narratives of internal and external pressures for policy reform are able to enter the
repertoire of legitimate stories about the Nordic Model.
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Notes
1. While the paper is not asking if a real and concrete Nordic model exists, the term is used
throughout the paper, partly because it is now common practice to frame Nordic welfare
debates with this terminology but partly because there is value in discussing the model as a
heuristic device.
2. The sample contains more trade union than business organization representatives, simply
due to the reason that the employer sector in both countries has two central business
employer organizations that play a signiﬁcant role as employer counterparts to the central
trade union organizations. While the blue collar central trade union organizations (SAK in
Finland and LO in Sweden) dominate, both countries have other powerful unions repre-
senting other sectors and a decision was made to include them in the sample.
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